be grouped into three underlying categories 1) economic incentives, 2) sanctions, and 3) norms. These types are all strongly interlinked and take various forms which are described below. They are all affected by and partly merge the usually separated logics of consequence and appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; March and Olsen 1998) . The resulting immediate drivers which combine the underlying drivers are 1) energy security, 2) avoiding future sanctions, 3) norm internalization, 4) norm internalization and competitiveness considerations, 5) reputation/norm socialization, 6) home country regulations, and 7) mimicry.
The first underlying driver, economic incentives, is the commonly assumed rationale guiding management decisions. Accordingly, a decision is made on whether a certain action should be taken or not following a cost-benefit-analyse. This often corresponds to rational choice approaches that are e.g. used to formally model aggregated utilitarist behaviour in markets.
Neoclassical assumptions such as complete markets are usually the basis of such formal rational choice models which are oriented towards utility maximization of calculating decision makers. The option that is connected to the greatest benefit and increase in utility or lowest loss of utility is chosen. Rational choice does however not imply that reason is the basis of a decision. Rather, it signifies "dispassionate calculation" (Morrel 2004) . Although modelling decisions according to rational choice theory seems to require a certain measurability of the qualities or utilities that are attributed to the different options, this does not mean that all measures are precisely known. This is especially true for complex business decisions on adjustments of the energy scheme.
Business gains and losses can stem from very diverse factors. They do not only originate from direct economic advantages such as productions cost reduction or improvement of sales figures. At first glance, reducing environmental impacts is often associated with higher costs and therefore rather with an economic disincentive. Yet, the so-called Porter hypothesis sustains the contrary. It says that strict environmental policies can become a company's comparative advantage (Porter and van der Linde 1995) . For instance, innovation and internal development can enhance competitiveness and at the same time contribute to mitigation (Porter and Kramer 2011). Implementing process improvement measures can lead to a diminished need for resources such as energy and to lower production costs. The "by-product", a reduction of GHG emissions, positively contributes to climate change mitigation. Thus, environment-friendly innovations can have direct material consequences that can be incentives for changing business behaviour.
Yet, although energy saving measures may make sense from a cost-benefit-analysis perspective this does not explain why companies voluntarily join the EEA. A reduction of energy input would be possible without this commitment and a comparative advantage shrinks if competitors take the same measures. Hence, seeking an accord which involves competing companies, as well, is likely to fail answering the purpose of increasing competitiveness through cost reduction.
Nevertheless, EEA participation can still be economically beneficial or necessary. A first group of factors relates to requisites conducive to businesses operation and is described by the so-called "shadow of anarchy" Ruggie 2004; Börzel 2010) .
Businesses rely on common goods and regulations which are necessary or just beneficial for their functioning. One essential public good is energy supply. Businesses depend strongly on stable and secure availability of energy. Yet, South Africa has been experiencing serious energy insecurities and the business sector has been affected by power shortages. Blackouts and on-going planning insecurities increase costs for companies. Reducing the overall energy consumption could improve supply stability and thereby the general business environment.
Yet, in the case of limited statehood a government might lack the capacity to introduce and enforce such regulations (Börzel and Risse 2010; Risse 2011) . Thus, if the state does not organize the provision of such a collective good, this can motivate pro-active business behaviour. Following the logic of a "shadow of anarchy", the absence of regulations and the perception that future regulations are also unlikely may lead to own initiatives to strengthen the institutional environment companies operate in. If companies have an interest in general energy saving as a way to increase security of supply and if the state cannot deliver necessary regulations the creation of an own accord may be the consequence. Engaging various companies is more beneficial than single energy efficiency initiatives. Joining the accord and pushing for a general agreement may therefore constitute an incentive for firms.
Following the cost-benefit rationale, this would be the case if the reduction of costs would exceed the initial costs for initiating the EEA and for adjusting the energy scheme. Thus, hypothesis 1 maintains that firms join and engage in the EEA to reduce costs and risks provoked by energy insecurity.
Sanctions are another factor which could raise costs in the form of fines for non-compliance with certain rules. Defying state control may cause more costs than changing production. Also, sanctions might not only provoke economic costs but might as well ban the entire company and could therefore be a crucial driver for changing operation procedures.
However, neither high energy consumption nor non-participation in the EEA does provoke any sanctions by the South African authorities. Since the EEA is a voluntary mechanism avoiding legal sanctions is not necessary. Rather, possible future sanctions by the state may be avoided by agreeing on a voluntary collective regulation. This may be especially relevant if business actors apprehend a regulation which is shaped against their favour. Likely, this is a potential regulation which is considered too strict. Yet, such a "shadow of hierarchy" depends on the strength of the institutions that potentially exercise control Scharpf 1997; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008) . Importantly, companies' managements may have differing perceptions of the "shadow of hierarchy" over them and perceive a corresponding threat. Hence, hypothesis 2, which maintains that avoiding coercive regulations by committing to a voluntary framework explains EEA membership, will also be taken into consideration.
The mentioned 3 rd driver, normative considerations, can motivate a company to adjust the energy scheme and contribute to the fight against climate change. Norms can be defined as "generalized expectations about appropriate behavior of actors with a given identity" . According to the corresponding logic of appropriateness, decisions are not necessarily taken along with one's own expected direct material consequences but considering what is regarded as appropriate behaviour in the social entity one belongs to (March and Olsen 1998) . Regarding climate-friendly behaviour, the respective norm is of global character and its diffusion has expanded to different degrees and to different areas ; see for theory on norms and their translation to the domestic (state)
context Jepperson, Wendt et al. 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1999; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999 ; see for diffusion of environmental norms: Correspondingly, ignoring norms can lead to reputation losses which can strongly affect a company's economic performance (Haufler 2001; Mol 2001; Blanton and Blanton 2007) . Reputation may also be relevant with respect to an entire sector. Preventing peers from spoiling the image of the own sector may be a reason for pushing for a collective agreement (Hönke, Kranz et al. 2008 ). Thus, hypothesis 5 says that reputation is the reason for EEA participation.
If business representatives name climate change as their motivation it is difficult to prove if really the considered appropriateness of the norm itself or the economic consequences of norm violation has been the "real" reason. Yet, to assess the action-guiding character of the norm, this is necessary. A norm needs to be shared and socialized to become a norm and to provoke corresponding social behaviour. Its strength does not depend on the individual internalization by corporate decision-makers. If they however name the norm as the reason for joining the EEA this points to its social action-guiding strength irrespective of any individual internalization. This means the norm is strong enough to impact on business behaviour.
Another reason for the initial initiative to adjust the individual energy scheme might be regulations originating from a company's home country. These regulations or standards are often attached to sanctions, the 2 nd driver, or also to normative considerations, the 3 rd driver. While very rarely sanctions are in place which permit home countries to enforce these rules for MNCs internationally, they affect the corporation domestically. These sanctions might in turn stem from norms socialized and translated into law in the home country. Alternatively, company headquarters themselves might have internalized certain norms. Internationally operating corporations very often have directives that affect all their companies in different countries and convey business systems and standards from their home countries. Also, if production procedures are streamlined and these practices are diffused in the entire international corporation it might be more costly to allow for diverging procedures in other countries even though no corresponding sanctions are in place (Jones 1999; Murphy 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001; van Tulder and Kolk 2001; Xing and Kolstad 2002; Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2003; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Flohr, Rieth et al. 2010) . As a result these companies might pressure for stricter regulations to avoid comparative disadvantages if adjustments in the energy scheme might provoke higher costs than savings. If the government reveals to be unable to introduce these regulations an own initiative can be a These seven hypotheses can give explanations for the companies' involvement in the EEA.
They comprehend 1) energy security, 2) avoiding future sanctions, 3) norm internalization, 4) norm internalization and competitiveness considerations, 5) reputation/norm socialization, 6) home country regulations, and 7) mimicry. In the following parts of this paper the explanatory power of these hypotheses is explored. As explained it is likely that more than one single factor has motivated joining the EEA.
Data and Analysis
To 
Results
In the following section, the findings for the seven drivers are presented.
Energy security
Energy security is an important issue and business risk for all South African companies.
Focussing on energy-intensive users, this importance becomes even more evident. All analysed companies depend on a stable energy supply. Black-outs in the past have hit the industry noticeably; the current instabilities affect operations; and future supply remains uncertain. This creates difficulties for on-going production and hampers adequate planning. Likewise, the perception of incapacities on the part of the government and of Eskom, South Africa's public utility, is widely spread irrespective of EEA membership. It is generally considered unlikely that Eskom will be capable of supplying adequately stable electricity in the short-and middle-term. Although new power plants are built, which has contributed to increasing electricity prices, it is not believed that they will be functioning adequately and Here, the members to the accord see a connection between this energy insecurity and their own energy efficiency activities and EEA membership (NBI 2011; NBI 2011) . This is partly presented as a general aim to become less dependent on energy volatility. By others there is a more direct link to the wish to help government fulfil its function. There is a clear intention to fill the gap which is left by government due to lacking capacities. One possible contribution is therefore seen in the collective endeavour to increase the general energy efficiency (Expert 1 2012; Member 3 2012; Member 4 2012). Thus, one driver for participation in the EEA is the lacking collective good of stable energy supply which is not delivered by the South African government or Eskom, respectively. The "shadow of anarchy" drives own initiatives. These initiatives are pursued even in the case of substantial immediate extra costs in order to create a better business environment in the middle-term.
Although the EEA is seen as a way to supporting stable electricity supply, non-members also pursue the same interest and show individual commitment. They do not participate in the accord but still engage in demand-management and offer support to government. Yet, they prefer these individual commitments over collective agreements. Thus, energy efficiency is a crucial driver for voluntary self-regulation and for contributing to providing the collective good of stable energy supply.
Avoiding future sanctions
The effect of possible future sanctions has changed during the years of EEA implementation.
While in the beginning companies rarely perceived that an introduction of state sanctions was likely they have become gradually more probable. Generally, avoiding future sanction Therefore, a perceived "shadow of hierarchy" or looming regulations can be considered as an existent but comparably weak driver for EEA participation.
Norm internalization
The analyzed South African company businesses are very aware of the climate change discourse. This is true for EEA members and non-members. All reject any notion of scepticism concerning the risks of climate change and its anthropogenic cause and already feel the need to adapt (Expert 1 2012; Member 4 2012). They also share the opinion that "something" has to be done against climate change and a willingness to contribute is shown NBI 2007; Mondi Group 2008; Implats 2011; Mondi Group 2011; NBI 2011; Member 3 2012; Member 4 2012) . Also, the connection between energy efficiency measures and climate change mitigation is acknowledged (ABB 2010; Mondi Group 2011; NBI 2011) .
Most of them, however, feel not predominantly responsible for action. Two reasons are given for this position. The first and most important reason is given by both EEA members and non-members alike. It is that climate change is not considered a priority in the face of other more pressing grievances and the perception of a comparably small share of global emissions produced in South Africa (Member 3 2012). All company representatives compare action for climate change mitigation to poverty eradication and economic development.
Here, it is emphasized on the one hand that mitigation activities might have adverse effects . Therefore, other norms prevail while an integration of those goals in sustainable development concepts is hardly ever comprehended. Second, climate change mitigation is associated with short-term costs instead of long term consequences (Sasol 2006; Sasol 2011) . This is on the one hand not surprising; on the other hand no connection between adaptation needs and mitigation possibilities is made. Also, climate change awareness has been increasing and was less pronounced in 2005 when the EEA was introduced. Therefore, climate change's effect on motivating original participation in the EEA must be considered limited (Implats 2006; Pick 'n Pay 2006; Mondi Group 2008; Pick 'n Pay 2010; Implats 2011; Mondi Group 2011; Member 4 2012) .
Nevertheless, companies have started to take initiative for behavioural change towards more climate friendly practices. They invest in education of employees raise awareness and
give guidance for changes to a more climate-friendly lifestyle and mindset. This does not only concern procedures in the working environment but also at home (Member 4 2012).
Thus, there is a willingness to invest in climate change mitigation from an own normative motivation if costs do not become too high. In general, it is acknowledged that companies can fulfil mitigation tasks and this function is not entirely attributed to other actors like the government. Yet, it is not enough for businesses to change behavior just because it is "the right thing to do" (Member 4 2012).
Non-members do not acknowledge the reputational effects of the EEA. On the one hand, the potential of the EEA in this respect is not recognized. This is also true for other activities with climate implications where some non-members have shown a rather late start and have not been seeking public attention (Non-Member 1 2012). On the other hand, it is neglected that the South African public and the customers share the positive attitude towards such initiatives (Non-Member 2 2012). A comparably smaller degree of socialization of the norm is therefore perceived by the non-members.
Altogether, reputational gains can be considered a crucial driver for EEA membership. The respective norm appears to be sufficiently socialized to be action-guiding for businesses.
Home country regulations
MNC have "group-wide" or international strategies and commitments which provide policies for issue areas such as energy consumption or environmental impact. These provisions impact on practices and reporting (Mondi Group 2008) and might impact on energy efficiency measure. Furthermore, companies standardize their environmental policies worldwide and apply guidelines like EU directives also to their operations in South Africa (Member 2 2011). Although the EEA membership may be in line with an international policy it is not found to be connected to direct mandates from headquarters in other countries.
Also, home country regulations might lead to certain energy efficiency measures but there is no intention to foster the EEA as a collective agreement in order to secure competitiveness.
Mimicry
Mimicry is generally not found to be a driver for EEA participation of energy-intensive users.
This seems very interesting because there are only slight differences in the level of other CSR commitments between members and non-members of the EEA (Results from Formalized
Interviews 2012) The EEA is not joined because competitors do so. However, other sectors have seen this behaviour, e.g. one bank stated that it had joined the EEA because all other banks had (Expert 1 2012). Yet, the examined companies do not share this motivation.
Non-members are not aware of other companies' EEA commitment. It is believed that almost "nobody has signed it" and that it is actually not "implemented" (Non-Member 1 2012; Non-Member 2 2012). It is therefore possible that they would have seen a stronger incentive to join the EEA if they had known about the number of signatories.
However, for the case of the EEA it can be assumed that mimicry has not been a crucial driver.
Information sharing and learning
One driver which cannot be adequately grouped under the other categories is the potential for information sharing, collaboration and learning which is seen in the EEA. This driver is frequently mentioned. This is considered particularly helpful in sectors and in relation to the government where distrust often impedes collaboration outside of institutionalized contexts. The awareness of the same risks and problems, especially regarding energy security and climate change consequences, has led to the acknowledgement that cooperation could benefit all affected. Thus, while outside the agreement information sharing is rare within the EEA a "culture" of knowledge sharing and even a certain Thus, if companies believe that certain concerns and problems are shared, an institutionalized framework, such as the EEA, can be seen as a chance to exchange information for mutual benefit irrespective of a general level of mistrust.
Conclusions
In the sections above it is analyzed why companies voluntarily and collectively commit to achieve a non-trivial target like 15 per cent energy reduction. The framework of analysis is based on two different logics of action: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. Importantly, these logics are not treated as distinct alternatives. Rather, several potential interlinkages and mutual influences are taken into account. Based on these connections seven drivers are developed which could have fostered cooperation on this issue among South African Companies. Subsequently these seven drivers are explored by using a variety of sources: expert interviews, interviews with company members, formalized interviews, and analysis of the company's sustainability reports.
For all analyzed companies the EEA is not the major driver to increase their efforts concerning energy efficiency. Furthermore, the EEA is only one part of the portfolio of different collaborative actions in answering the energy challenges. All companies are also part of the different programs of Eskom to manage the South African energy demand.
From all different drivers, it seems that energy security is the most important. This is not very surprising as the blackouts in recent years put South African industry in a very uncomfortable position. While energy efficiency issues in terms of costs could have been handled by each company themselves, the energy shortages required a common approach.
Only by collective action the energy supply can be stabilized. So every partner benefits from a collective reduction.
Another crucial driver is reputation. All examined companies assume that a norm of climatefriendly behavior is sufficiently socialized as to guide consumer decisions. Therefore, the EEA is used to communicate such a behavior and benefit from reputational gains. Thus, irrespective of the individual internalization of such a norm its action-guiding power is unfolded and drives EEA participation to a substantial extent.
When it comes to individual internalization, the recognition of climate change as a relevant problem and the internalization of norms differ only marginally between companies that participate in the EEA and those who do not. While there is a general recognition of climate change as a problem, neither a systematic variation between members and non-members nor the norm as such as a driver for EEA participation can be established.
Because of the setting in South Africa as an "area of limited statehood", the expected role of potential governmental sanctions to is relatively low. A general trend towards fear of government regulation can be seen, like of the proposed carbon tax due to assumed competition disadvantages for the domestic industry. Also, potential effects of home country regulations and mimicry are not found as decisively impacting the membership decision.
One interesting aspect which is frequently found as a motivation for EEA participation is the potential such a collective agreement has regarding knowledge sharing and collaboration in the face of a generally distrustful relation between different companies as well as between some companies and the government. The institutionalized framework of the EEA offers a vehicle for collaboration which is perceived as providing mutual benefits regarding shared challenges and risks such as climate change consequences, energy insecurity and increasing electricity price pressure.
From a theoretical point of view, it seems interesting that all interviewed companies agree on the need to adapt to and to mitigate climate change and all of them took some measures to increase energy efficiency, but only some of them participate in the EEA. Although all members state that direct cost reduction through energy efficiency innovations is a main driver for EEA participation this actually cannot explain why a collective commitment is chosen over individual action since non-members also explain their energy efficiency initiatives referring to cost reduction. The potential of the EEA to contribute to energy security and reputational gains is however not realized by the examined non-members. It is therefore rather a different perception of the various drivers and their consequences which lead to different decisions regarding the EEA.
